


Taken Out of Context: Security Risks with Security Code AutoFill in iOS & macOS

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verify

Please check your messages for
a six-digit security code and
enter it below.

 From Messages
Fill code 180605

Submit




PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND

Have you ever...

- received a **security code via SMS?**
- needed to
 - 1. memorise** or **manually copy** the code,
 - 2. switch** apps, and
 - 3. quote it** on the other app?
- found it **cumbersome** to do all this?

Last year, Apple introduced a new convenience feature:
Security Code AutoFill



SECURITY CODE AUTOFILL

1. **Security Code AutoFill** scans incoming SMS for security codes

2. Webpages and apps self-declare input fields for security codes

3. iOS and macOS suggest to insert code into active app or webpage

One Time Passcode

We'll send a text message with One Time Passcode to your mobile phone.

Never share a One Time Passcode with another person.

We'll send the message to +4474*****246

Send passcode

This number is wrong

MESSAGES now

SANTANDER

NEVER share this code, even with Santander staff.
OTP 46187 MAKE A NEW PAYMENT of £100.00 to ac...

We've sent your code to +4474*****246.

Never share a One Time Passcode with another person.

Enter One Time Passcode

Submit

From Messages
46187 (£100.00)

1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
0

One Time Passcode

We've sent your code to +4474*****246.

Never share a One Time Passcode with another person.


Enter One Time Passcode

Submit

From Messages
46187 (£100.00)

1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
0

WORKS WITH ALL TYPES OF SECURITY CODES



One Time Password (OTP)

- User authentication, e.g. remote login

One Time Authorisation (OTA)

- Software activation or registration to a phone number, e.g. instant messenger

Transaction Authorisation Number (TAN)

- Verification of integrity of instructions received by the server, e.g. online payments

AUTOFILL USER INTERFACE

OTP

PayPal: Your security code is: 834956. Your code expires in 5 minutes. Please don't reply.


OTA

Your WhatsApp code is 376-768 but you can simply tap on this link to verify your device:


v.whatsapp.com/376768

TAN

NEVER share this code, even with Santander staff. OTP 12778 MAKE A NEW PAYMENT of £100.00 to account ending 0972. Please call us if this wasn't you.



HOW THINGS GO WRONG...




Uh oh ...






THE SOURCE OF RISKS

Security Code AutoFill **de-contextualises security codes**, but relies on users to make **security-cautious decisions**.





EXAMPLE: REMOTE LOGIN





EXAMPLE: ONLINE SHOPPING

Protecting your card online

Please do not click the refresh or back button as this may interrupt or terminate your transaction
Please fill in the form below and click the submit button to complete your transaction.




**Voucher Express - Discount applied**
 6047
£ 17.30

Please approve this through your Monzo app and return to this page to [complete the payment.](#)

Having trouble?



[Use SMS](#) [I've approved this](#)



[Cancel this transaction](#)




Verified by **VISA** **MasterCard.**
SecureCode.

 **Customer Helpline**
0371 384 5931




**Voucher Express - Discount applied**
 6047
£ 17.30

Enter your SMS code



 From Messages
Fill code 531545 (£17.30)

[I've approved this](#)

[Cancel this transaction](#)



EXAMPLE: ONLINE SHOPPING



ATTACKS WE DEMONSTRATED




- Login to remote account despite 2FA protection.
- Hijack the user's instant messenger installation.



- User pays for wrong online credit card payment despite 3D-Secure protection.
- Redirect an online banking transaction despite transaction authorization protection.

IN SUMMARY: CONTEXT MATTERS



THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

Taken Out of Context: Security Risks with Security Code AutoFill in iOS & macOS

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THE FORESHADOWING



SMS Code Auto-fill

Auto-fill SMS Codes

Allow auto-fill service to access SMS messages to retrieve verification code



Auto-fill must be enabled to automatically fill SMS codes. You can enable auto-fill in Settings → System → Languages & Input → Advanced → Auto-fill service.



Allow **Application** to automatically enter verification codes from text messages?

You can change the settings in
Settings → Google → Verification code autofill.

Deny

Allow

IDEAS FOR ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS


Two main design challenges:

- Salient context data shall be extracted from the SMS, yet SMS shall remain legible for users without the feature.
- Character and space constraints on the length of SMS and from the device's screen, respectively.

Opportunities we identified:

1. Replace '*From Messages*' text with information about the sender.
2. Introduction of '*Keywords*' in SMS for context information.
3. Method to specify intended website/app in the SMS.

Alternative: Display the entire SMS on the screen



REMOTE LOGIN

Scenario:

- User has an account with PayPal and activated the Two-Factor Authentication feature.
- Adversary knows user's PayPal credentials, i.e. email address and password.



Attack vector:

- Adversary sends a phishing email for an unrelated, 'low-risk' website to the user.

People are less likely to detect phishing emails of 'low-risk' websites due to changes in the expected cost-benefit ratio.¹

¹ Herley, C. (2009). So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users. NSPW.

REMOTE LOGIN

Adversary

Sends phishing email
(low-risk website).


Begins login to the
user's PayPal account.
PayPal sends 2FA
code to user.

Adversary uses 2FA
code to complete
PayPal login.

User

Clicks on link in
phishing email.

Security Code
AutoFill suggests
filling the PayPal
security code on
this website. User
confirms
suggestion.




APP REGISTERED TO PHONE NUMBER

Scenario:

- Adversary wants to hijack other people's WhatsApp messenger to subsequently social engineer and defraud their contacts.
- User browses Internet via unsecured public WiFi.

Attack vector:

- Adversary conducts a trawling Man-in-the-Middle attack on an unencrypted Wi-Fi, scans websites for social login buttons (e.g. ) , and injects a fake WhatsApp login button.



APP REGISTERED TO PHONE NUMBER

Adversary

Inserts fake WhatsApp login button on websites loaded from public WiFi.

Installs WhatsApp and quotes user's mobile phone number. WhatsApp sends OTA code to user.

Adversary uses OTA code to hijack the user's WhatsApp account.

User

Clicks fake WhatsApp login button. Submits phone number as instructed by website.

Security Code AutoFill suggests filling the security code on this website. User confirms suggestion.



ONLINE PAYMENT

Scenario:

- User wants to make a credit card payment at an online shop.
- Adversary wants user to make payment for their purchase instead.

Attack vector:

- The adversary has infected the user's MacBook with malware, e.g. a Man-in-the-Browser attack.



ONLINE PAYMENT

Adversary

Prepares online shopping of price less or equal to user's intended purchase. Malware redirects user to corresponding payment website and tampers view to resemble intended purchase.


Malware edits HTML code to enable the Security Code AutoFill feature.

User

Proceeds to check out their online shopping.

Enters credit card details and requests security code via SMS.

Security Code AutoFill suggests filling the security code on this website. User confirms suggestion.



APPLE'S SECURITY BOUNTY POLICY

Apple does not reward the security risks we identified through their Bug Bounty program.

They recognise the following:

Category	Maximum payment (USD)
Secure boot firmware components	\$200,000
Extraction of confidential material protected by the Secure Enclave	\$100,000
Execution of arbitrary code with kernel privileges	\$50,000
Unauthorized access to iCloud account data on Apple servers	\$50,000
Access from a sandboxed process to user data outside of that sandbox	\$25,000

https://www.apple.com/business/site/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

METHODOLOGY: COGNITIVE WALKTHROUGH IN MALICIOUS SETTINGS

Cognitive Walkthrough (CW)

One or more evaluators work through a series of tasks from the user's perspective and evaluate the systems ability to guide its users towards achieving their goals.

Define:

- User interface and context
- User and their goals
- User's necessary sequence of actions

Questions asked at each step of a CW:

1. Will the user know what to do at this step?
2. If the user does the right thing, will they know they did the right thing and make progress towards their goal?

CW in Malicious Settings

We extend the CW methodology to enable the simulation of an adversary.

Define:

- Adversary goals
- Threat model and attack vectors

Additional questions asked at each step of a CW in Malicious Settings:

3. What actions could an adversary take to get closer to their goal?
4. How could the user foil such an attack at this step?

Benefits of CW in Malicious Settings

- Focused evaluations of selected features:
 - Easier to evaluate events that might rarely occur during an empirical user study
 - Avoids bias when asking participants to focus on certain tasks/events
 - Easier to transfer results between different versions or variations of the evaluated system
- Avoiding partial disclosure / deception:
 - Sensitive tasks can require researchers to withhold information about the nature and objectives of the research.

Use of CW in Malicious Settings

- Prototyping / development
- Pre-studies
- Identifying security and privacy risks

BACKGROUND: DESIGN OF SECURITY MESSAGES

- Principle of ‘*Explicit Communication*’ (Abadi and Needham, 1996)

“Every message should say what it means: the interpretation of the message should depend only on its content.”

- ‘*Design principles for warning messages*’ (Laughery and Wogalter, 1997)

- Be concise but clearly convey the message
- Use concrete rather than abstract wording
- Avoid unfamiliar abbreviations or ambiguous statements
- Use short sentences with short, familiar words
- Messages should be explicit in what the reader should do or not do